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ABSTRACT: The health reform bills passed by the U.S. House of Representatives and under 
consideration in the Senate introduce a range of payment and delivery system changes 
designed to achieve a significant slowing of health care cost growth. Most assessments of 
health reform legislation have focused only on the federal budgetary impact. This study 
projects the effect of national reform on total national health expenditures and the insur-
ance premiums that American families would likely pay. We estimate that the combination 
of provisions in the House and Senate bills would save $683 billion or more in national 
health spending over the 10-year period 2010–2019 and lower premiums by nearly $2,000 
per family. Moreover, the annual growth rate in national health expenditures could be 
slowed from 6.4 percent to 6.0 percent.
                    
OveRvieW
To judge the merit of health reform proposals, it is essential to understand the 
impact of the provisions on both the affordability of insurance coverage and over-
all health care spending. Most assessments of the current congressional health 
reform bills, however, have taken a federal budgetary perspective only. These 
include the estimates prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which 
“scored” the federal budget impacts of the Affordable Health Care for America 
Act (H.R. 3962, the House bill)1 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act  (the Senate bill),2 finding in each case a modest deficit reduction in the first 
10 years of implementation. 
But the federal budget impact is not the same as the health system impact. 
Some of the federal funds would be used to reduce costs for people who already 
have health insurance coverage but struggle to afford it, while others would 
assist very small businesses with the cost of insurance premiums. To estimate 
health spending accurately, we need to separate out the costs into new health care 
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Office estimates that spending for uninsured individu-
als, if they become insured, would increase by 25 to 60 
percent.6 The actual increase will depend in part on the 
rates that are paid to health care providers for treating 
currently uninsured patients.
For our estimates, we increase the $1,600 figure 
over time with expected increases in medical costs. 
We then multiply the revised amounts by the number 
of newly insured resulting from the various legislative 
proposals to produce a total estimate. Fully phased in, 
incremental coverage costs about $75 billion per year 
to cover 60 percent of the uninsured, or 2 percent of 
total health care spending. This is comparable to the 
estimate of Davis and Schoen,7 who project that cover-
ing all of the uninsured would add 3 percent to medical 
spending, and Schoen, Davis, and Collins, who found 
that covering all of the uninsured would add 2 percent 
to medical spending.8 This methodology suggests that 
the Senate bill would lead to a 10-year cumulative 
medical spending increase of $402 billion over the 
period 2010–2019, and that the House bill would lead 
to a cost increase of $549 billion (reflecting the greater 
coverage under that bill). These estimates are shown in 
the first row of Exhibit 1.
Savings in Public Programs
Both the House and Senate health reform bills con-
tain a number of changes to Medicare and Medicaid 
payments. Many of these are traditional payment 
changes—for example, reductions in the amount paid 
to Medicare Advantage managed care plans to a level 
comparable to the cost of covering beneficiaries under 
traditional Medicare, or smaller increases in Medicare 
inpatient payments to account for a likely increase in 
productivity. We take estimates of the impact of these 
changes on medical spending from CBO, noting that 
while this is a good place to begin, the CBO has in 
the past often misestimated, or failed to estimate, the 
behavioral consequences of such changes.9 
We consider all such changes, with a few 
exceptions. First, we exempt the net savings associ-
ated with health care modernization (Section 1104 
and Title III, subtitle A, of the Senate bill; Titles III 
spending and transfers of existing spending from the 
private sector to the government. Furthermore, CBO 
assigned very little savings to system reform efforts, 
rendering its overall analysis incomplete.  
The Office of the Actuary within the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), meanwhile, 
estimated the health system impacts of H.R. 39623 and 
determined there would be a small increase in medi-
cal spending as a result of the reform. But, again, this 
analysis is limited, since it gives almost no weight to 
proposals for improving the information available to 
providers and modifying the financial incentives in the 
current system. 
This study considers the Senate bill introduced 
by Senator Harry Reid on November 18, 2009, and 
the House bill passed on November 7, 2009, to project 
the impact of major health reform on national health 
expenditures and the insurance premiums that fami-
lies would likely pay, accounting for the full range of 
impacts the legislation is likely to induce. As part of 
our analysis, we provide estimates of the effect of key 
provisions on health spending by government, employ-
ers, and households. 
imPACT Of RefORm On nATiOnAl HeAlTH 
exPendiTuReS
Health care reform will affect national health expendi-
tures through five major channels. 
impact of new Coverage
Extending health insurance coverage to essentially all 
Americans would increase medical spending, at least 
in the short run. (Some argue that increased coverage 
will lower spending over time by making it possible 
to pursue more-aggressive cost-containment poli-
cies without risking access to care for the uninsured, 
but in this analysis we do not consider such effects.4) 
From previous studies, data are available to estimate 
the magnitude of the increase in spending. Hadley and 
colleagues, for example, estimate that each uninsured 
individual who gains coverage will incur annually 
an additional $1,600 of medical care expenses—an 
increase of 70 percent.5 The Congressional Budget 
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and IV and certain parts of Title I of the House bill), 
which we consider separately. We also omit the sec-
tions associated with coverage expansions, which are 
accounted for above. Finally, we omit savings from the 
Community Living Assistance Services and Supports 
(CLASS) Act, which are a collection of premiums in 
anticipation of future spending. CBO estimates that the 
net impact of the remaining proposals in the Senate bill 
is to reduce Medicare and Medicaid spending by $393 
billion over the 2010–2019 period. The comparable 
value for the House bill is $364 billion. These esti-
mates are depicted in the second row of Exhibit 1.
The reduction in Medicare and Medicaid spend-
ing is approximately on par with the increase in medi-
cal costs associated with covering the uninsured. The 
net impact of covering the uninsured and reducing 
traditional program payments (and other taxes from 
outside the health care system) would be an increase in 
spending of $9 billion over 2010–2019 in the Senate 
bill and an increase of $185 billion over the same 
period in the House bill. This roughly parallels the 
analysis from the Office of the Actuary, which esti-
mated that national medical expenditures under H.R. 
3962 would increase by $289 billion over 2010–2019. 
The difference of about $10 billion per year is very 
small on the scale of health expenditures (less than 
1 percent per year) and indicates that this analysis 
matches that of the actuary when no other cost changes 
are considered.
Our analysis assumes that reduced Medicare  
and Medicaid payments are not offset by higher prices 
to private payers, and equivalently that greater cov-
erage does not result in savings to existing payers 
because of reduced cost-shifting. This assumption is 
common to other estimators and is consistent with 
empirical research.10
insurance exchanges and the Public Option
Currently, nearly 13 percent of insurance premiums are 
accounted for by administrative costs.11 These costs 
range from about 5 percent in large firms and firms that 
are self-insured to 30 percent for individuals. Higher 
costs for marketing, underwriting, churning, benefit 
complexity, and brokers’ fees explain the bulk of the 
difference. 
Both the House and Senate bills propose insur-
ance exchanges that would group individuals and small 
firms into larger entities and thus drive down those 
administrative costs. A public option would contribute 
to this effort. In many areas of the country, there is 
little meaningful insurance competition. By providing 
such competition, the public option can drive down 
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profits and force insurers to streamline other compo-
nents of administration, including benefit design. The 
House bill would offer a public health insurance plan 
in the exchange, and the Senate bill would establish a 
public option, with states being able to opt out at their 
choosing. Each of these would reinforce the impact of 
insurance exchanges.
The exchange could also minimize marketing 
costs through more transparent posting of premiums, 
facilitated enrollment (assistance with the applica-
tion process and screening for eligibility), and stron-
ger oversight of industry practices. The House bill 
establishes additional insurance market regulations, 
including repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption 
from antitrust laws, a requirement that plans devote 85 
percent of premiums to medical care, and authority for 
states to review and reject premium increases. These 
can be expected to place downward pressure on admin-
istrative costs. 
If all individuals and small firms received the 
same premiums as large firms or self-insured firms do, 
the costs of insurance administration would decline to 
less than 10 percent. The Commonwealth Fund ana-
lyzed the experience of other countries and estimated 
that administrative costs could fall to 8 percent or 
lower under a robust exchange system.12 We assume 
more modest savings, such that administrative costs 
fall to 10 percent of total premiums. We assume that 
rate is constant over time, even though this implies 
administrative costs increase along with national health 
spending. We assume such savings begin in 2013 under 
the House bill and 2014 under the Senate proposal, the 
years the exchanges would become operational, and 
are phased in over three years. The reduction in health 
spending associated with reduced insurer administra-
tion is $191 billion to $221 billion over 2010–2019.
CBO estimates some reduction in premiums 
from exchanges, but not as large: between 1 and 4 
percent for small groups, and no savings for large 
groups, for an average of about 0.4 percent.13 Applying 
such estimates yields 10-year savings of $29 billion to 
$34 billion. We assume additional savings above this 
amount, totaling $162 billion under the Senate proposal 
and $187 under the House bill over 2010–2019 (see 
third line of Exhibit 1).
Health System modernization
Both the House and Senate bills include numerous pro-
visions to change the information available to patients 
and providers and the incentives facing medical care 
providers, and thus make medical care more efficient. 
The Commonwealth Fund has recently summarized 
these provisions.14 Within the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs, these include:
Payment innovations, including higher reim-•	
bursement for preventive care services and 
patient-centered primary care, bundled pay-
ment for acute and post-acute medical ser-
vices, shared savings or capitation payments 
for accountable provider groups that assume 
responsibility for the continuum of a patient’s 
care, and pay-for-performance incentives for 
Medicare providers;
Negotiation of pharmaceutical prices (in the •	
House bill);
Increased funding for comparative effectiveness •	
research;
Profiling medical care providers on the basis of •	
cost and quality, making that data available to 
consumers and insurance plans, and providing 
financial incentives for relatively low-quality, 
high-cost providers to improve their care;
Increased emphasis on wellness and prevention;•	
Mechanisms to streamline demonstration and •	
pilot projects in Medicare and the rapid expan-
sion of successful models across the program;
An ongoing Medicare commission to recom-•	
mend structural changes to Medicare and put 
such recommendations on fast-track consider-
ation in Congress (in the Senate bill); and an 
Institute of Medicine study of geographic varia-
tion in health care spending, and authority for 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
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(HHS) to rapidly implement recommendations 
to address such variations (in the House bill); 
and
An excise tax on high-cost insurance plans (in •	
the Senate bill). 
In addition, the House bill gives the HHS sec-
retary authority to use innovative payment methods 
in a public health insurance option as well, including 
bundled-payment systems and value-based insurance 
design, to further the impact of these reforms.
The exact amount that would be saved from 
these provisions collectively is uncertain. Partly as a 
result of this uncertainty, CBO and the Office of the 
Actuary assume only minor savings. For example, 
CBO estimates that the major parts of the bill including 
these provisions would cost $10 billion over the 2010–
2019 period, and the Office of the Actuary assumes 
savings of only $2 billion. 
Other estimates, however, suggest that an 
aggressive approach to health care modernization 
could result in significantly greater cost reductions. 
Beeuwkes-Buntin and Cutler estimate that signifi-
cant health care reform could reduce cost increases 
by 1.5 percentage points annually, or more than $700 
billion in the 10-year window.15 These savings would 
come from two primary sources. First, administrative 
expenses incurred by provider groups would decline as 
electronic medical records and incentives to use them 
appropriately are widely disseminated. The potential 
for administrative savings have been stressed by both 
provider groups and insurers,16 and are distinct from 
the reduction in insurance administration noted above. 
Second, reform would lead to fewer and less-costly 
acute care episodes. Preventing certain recurrent ill-
nesses by coordinating care better and rationalizing 
what is done when a person becomes sick, bundling 
payments, paying more for quality care, and sharing 
savings with accountable provider organizations are all 
areas of potentially substantial savings.
Similarly, Hussey, Eibner, Ridgely, and 
McGlynn estimate that savings of more than 10 percent 
are possible, largely from payment reforms like bun-
dled-payment systems. Realizing these savings over a 
decade would imply cost reductions of nearly 1.5 per-
centage points annually.17
The Senate bill includes a Medicare commission 
to help control costs, while the House bill grants the 
HHS secretary authority to negotiate pharmaceutical 
prices and apply innovative payment methods broadly 
in Medicare and a public health insurance plan. The 
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combination of provisions in the House and Senate 
bills would achieve substantial savings in total health 
spending. A Commonwealth Fund report indicates 
that similar provisions would slow the annual growth 
in national health expenditures from 6.5 percent to 
5.6 percent over the period 2010–2020.18 Thus, cost 
reductions on the order of 1.0 percentage points are 
realistic. To be conservative, we consider cost savings 
of a smaller amount: a reduction of 0.75 percentage 
points annually. We assume such savings are first real-
ized in 2012, to allow time for payment changes to be 
designed and implemented. 
The public and private savings from health sys-
tem modernization are $530 billion over the 10 years 
(see fourth line of Exhibit 1). These savings are smaller 
in the early years but increase over time. 
Taking account of these different factors, on 
net the Senate bill should reduce health care spending 
by $683 billion over 2010–2019, and the House bill 
should reduce health spending by $532 billion. The 
smaller reduction in the House bill reflects the increase 
in coverage over the Senate bill, especially in the early 
years of reform. Exhibit 2 shows the changes by year, 
highlighting the difference associated with earlier and 
greater coverage.
We find that the annual rate of growth in 
national health expenditures falls from 6.4 percent, 
absent reform, to 6.0 percent under the Senate proposal 
(Exhibit 3). When the current projection is corrected 
to reflect underutilization of services by the uninsured, 
the Senate reform package lowers the annual rate of 
growth from 6.6 percent to 6.0 percent, a reduction of 
0.6 percentage points per year. Similar results are pro-
jected under the House bill. 
The savings we estimate are comparable to the 
CBO and Office of the Actuary reports, with the excep-
tion that we also include reasonable impacts of system 
modernization incentives and efforts to streamline sales 
of insurance. 
imPACT On THe fedeRAl BudgeT
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the 
reform bills passed by the House and under consider-
ation in the Senate would reduce the federal deficit by 
$130 billion to $138 billion over the 10 years, 2010–
2019. Our estimates of the federal deficit impact differ 
from CBO’s in two ways. First, we include savings to 
Medicare and Medicaid resulting from health system 
modernization. In addition, reductions in employer 
spending for health insurance lead to increases in 
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wage and salary payments, which are taxed by the 
federal government. While CBO accounted for some 
of this effect in recent estimates, further reductions in 
employer spending for health insurance due to modern-
ization and lower administrative costs can be expected. 
We assume that 90 percent of private health insurance 
savings are passed on to employees through increased 
wages, which are taxed at an average marginal rate of 
28 percent.
The net effect is a federal deficit reduction of 
between $409 billion and $459 billion (Exhibit 4). 
The net effect is made up of several factors. As out-
lined above, the federal cost of coverage expansion 
is projected at $748 billion under the Senate bill and 
$891 under the House bill. Savings from payment and 
system reform provisions are projected to generate 
between $680 billion and $681 billion—substantially 
more than is estimated by CBO, owing to the reason-
able estimates of health system modernization provi-
sions. Our federal tax revenue projection mirrors that 
of CBO, though we also add in the additional revenue 
from employer savings and increased wages from mod-
ernization and lower administrative costs—projected 
to raise $90 billion to $95 billion over the 10-year, 
2010–2019 period.
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imPACT On mediCARe
Medicare expenditures are currently projected to grow 
by 6.6 percent annually from 2010 to 2019 (Exhibit 5). 
The Senate bill’s payment and system reform savings 
estimated by CBO total $387 billion when CLASS 
and non-Medicare provisions are removed. Applying 
these net Medicare savings bends the Medicare spend-
ing curve and reduces the projected annual growth rate 
to 5.3 percent. When additional savings from health 
system modernization are accounted for, the annual 
growth rate is reduced to 4.6 percent and total 10-year 
savings reach $576 billion. Similar results are projected 
under the House health reform bill.
imPACT On PRemiumS fOR  
PRivATe COveRAge
Reducing insurer administration and modernizing 
the delivery of health care services will each result in 
reductions in private insurance premiums. Private pre-
miums might be affected by other provisions as well. 
For example, health reform might change the generos-
ity of the average benefits offered, thus raising or low-
ering premiums. In the current market, many people 
have coverage that is extremely limited, with deduct-
ibles totaling many thousands of dollars and classes of 
services that are excluded. Such people will face price 
increases under reform, although the quality of the cov-
erage will be significantly improved and out-of-pocket 
expenses reduced. The Congressional Budget Office 
estimates that such changes will increase non-group 
premiums. For purposes of this analysis, we exclude 
changes in premiums associated with better coverage, 
since one would need to consider the impacts of the 
enhanced coverage and correspondingly lower  
out-of-pocket spending to gauge accurately the impact 
of the changes. 
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In addition, health reform might change the 
risk pool and thus affect the average cost of enrollees. 
Limiting age-based underwriting without providing 
offsetting subsidies to young adults would drive many 
within this population out of the insurance market. 
Close-to-universal coverage, in contrast, might bring 
more young people into the market, thus lowering pre-
miums. Because of the issues associated with changes 
in out-of-pocket spending when people move in and 
out of coverage, we again omit this effect.
We estimate the impact of insurance exchanges 
and system reform on average premiums using a 
method analogous to the one proposed above. In par-
ticular, we consider how reductions in administrative 
loads and more-efficient care delivery will affect aver-
age market premiums. The basis for the premium esti-
mates is the average employer premium in 2006, taken 
from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey.19 This 
premium is then trended forward using the projected 
growth of premiums under the different scenarios.  
Exhibit 6 shows the premium estimates. 
Without reform, premiums are expected to increase 
from $13,649 in 2010 to $22,535 in 2019. Relative to 
this increase, premiums under reform increase only 
three-quarters as much. By 2019, family premiums 
are $1,900 lower. Adding reductions in out-of-pocket 
costs and lower taxes for Medicare and Medicaid 
would result in estimated savings for the typical fam-
ily of over $2,500 that year. Again, these are conser-
vative estimates. A recent analysis by the Business 
Roundtable prepared by Hewitt, for example, found 
that such legislative reforms could potentially reduce 
the trend line in employment-based health care spend-
ing by $3,000 per employee by 2019.20
Data: Authors’ estimates. 
Exhibit 6. Estimated Annual Premiums Under Different 
Scenarios, 2019 
8.4% 
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Explaining the Differences with Other Estimates
The estimated health system savings we present are larger than those forecast by the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Office of the Actuary, which are 
similar to each other. The common assessments of CBO and the CMS Office of the Actuary are not surprising. 
Those groups rely largely on peer-reviewed studies utilizing carefully controlled comparison groups (either 
randomized trials or the natural equivalent) for their evidence. Within that genre, the dominant published 
themes are the inexorable nature of technology-led medical care cost increases, and the resulting need for 
unalterable demand or supply-side constraints to confront that trend. Although there is significant evidence 
in the literature that medical care providers are responsive to financial incentives,21 there is not much 
evidence in the published literature on policy reforms short of severe constraints that save large amounts of 
money. And for every study that does show savings from baseline, there is another study that does not. Thus, 
the common assessment is that there is little efficacious that can be done.
There is, however, a less formal, but no less important, literature that sees the world very differently. Business 
scholars, including Michael Porter and Elizabeth Teisberg, and Clay Christenson, Jerome Grossman, and Jason 
Hwang, all note the enormous inefficiency in health care relative to other industries: excessive administrative 
spending, wasted time and money, and resources spent passing along costs, not reducing them.22 They 
highlight the enormous potential for productivity improvement that reform can drive if it makes health care 
operate more like other industries.
Experiences of health care practitioners reach a similar conclusion. Physicians on the front line, including Guy 
Clifton, Arthur Garson, Atul Gawande, and Arnold Relman see waste, know it exists, and have a common view 
about why it exists—misaligned incentives being the major driver.23 They present a story of care that could be 
better and cheaper, but operates in a system that discourages it. This story is echoed in journalistic accounts 
of health care.24 A number of recent books show how the health care system fails patients, physicians, and 
society as a payer. In each case, the common theme is misaligned incentives, with the call for reforms that 
change the underlying incentives.  
A number of case studies provide support for the potential of reform. The experience of Geisinger Health 
System, HealthPartners, Denver Health, and others all illustrate that health can be improved and costs 
lowered.25 They also show the components that are most important for system improvement. These case 
studies are often in the published literature but lack the careful comparison groups that make the results 
compelling to the most skeptical reviewers. Thus, their results are not given as much emphasis as they 
otherwise might.
While evidence regarding appropriate evidence standards differs, the situation we analyze is one where there 
are essentially no clinical trials and where effects of large policy changes may differ substantially from effects 
of small trials. In such a situation, it is imperative to cast a wider net than traditional evidence standards. Our 
decision to be more inclusive in the use of evidence is the primary reason why our results differ from those of 
CBO and the CMS Office of the Actuary.
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COnCluSiOn
The bills passed by the House and under consider-
ation in the Senate introduce a range of payment and 
delivery system changes likely to result in a significant 
slowing of health care cost growth. First, the bills call 
for the creation of health insurance exchanges that 
would offer a choice of plans—including a public 
plan—and the ability, for the first time, to truly com-
pare plan premiums. In the House bill, an exchange 
would have authority to reject plans with excessive 
premiums and set caps on insurance profits and over-
head of no more than 15 percent of the premium, pro-
viding savings to employers and workers that might 
reach 15 to 20 percent by 2019. 
The bills also change how providers are paid 
and care is delivered, in ways that begin to reward 
value, not volume of services. Both the House and 
Senate bills would accelerate the testing, adoption, 
and spread of innovative payment methods to control 
growth in volume of services. The bills also include 
extensive provisions to report data on quality and cost 
and to enhance choice. Finally, the House bill calls for 
negotiated pharmaceutical prices, reduction of over-
priced services, investment in primary and preventive 
care, and other changes that have the potential to yield 
substantial savings. 
We estimate that the combination of provisions 
in the House and Senate bills would save $683 billion 
or more in national health spending over 2010–2019 
and lower premiums by nearly $2,000 per family. The 
annual growth rate in national health expenditures 
could be slowed from 6.4 percent to 6.0 percent. 
Congress has a historic opportunity to pass 
comprehensive health care reform legislation this leg-
islative session and ensure that all families are able to 
get the care they need, as well as financial security and 
relief from rising premiums. Fortunately, the bills  
currently under consideration offer a significant first 
step toward bending the health care cost curve for the 
federal government and families and yield real  
economic benefits. 
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